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Abstract
This paper investigates the link between management practices and workforce skills in manu-
facturing firms, exploiting geographical variation in the supply of human capital. Skills measures
are constructed using newly compiled data on universities and regional labour markets across 19
countries. Consistent with management practices being complementary with skills, we show that
firms further away from universities employ fewer skilled workers and are worse managed, even
after controlling for a rich set of observables and fixed effects. Analysis using regional skill premia
suggests that variation in the price of skill drives these relationships.
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There have been major advances in the measurement and analysis of management practices in
recent years. Survey data have established the importance of management practices in explaining
differentials in productivity between and within countries and sectors (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007;
Bloom et al., 2014b). Recent analysis has estimated that across countries, management explains on
average around 30 per cent of the gap in total factor productivity with the United States (Bloom et al.,
2016), and experimental evidence from Indian textile plants has shown that management plays a
causal role in this regard (Bloom et al., 2013).1 However, less is known about why firms adopt different
management practices (Bloom et al., 2019). Given that management practices are so important for
firm performance, and can be measured and benchmarked across firms, why do we not see all firms
adopting best practice?
Motivated by previously documented associations between plant level management practices and
skills (see for example Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom et al., 2014b), this paper uses data from
the World Management Survey (WMS) on manufacturing plants to test the hypothesis that human
capital and management practices are complements. We construct a new dataset across 19 countries
related to plant and region-level skill availability, and in “factor demand” equations (Brynjolfsson
and Milgrom, 2013), find robust evidence that firms facing more abundant (and cheaper) skills have
higher management scores, ceteris paribus. This supports the hypothesis that modern management
practices and a skilled workforce are complementary, consistent with a skilled workforce increasing
the marginal benefit or lowering the marginal cost associated with good management practices, so
that firms facing a skill-abundant workforce employ more skilled labour and have better management
practices in equilibrium. In this sense, good management practices - adopted as a consequence of the
channel studied here - are examples of “skill biased management”.
Assuming that labour markets are local in nature (Moretti, 2011), we construct two main measures
of local or regional skill supply. The first measure is the plant specific distance to nearest university.
We calculate this as a drive time using geocoded information on WMS plants (across regions in 19
countries) and universities from the World Higher Education Database (WHED) - an international
listing of higher education institutions. The second measure of skill supply is the regional skill
premium. To calculate this we obtain labour force microdata in 13 countries, which allow us to run
wage regressions and estimate the wage premium for university graduates at the subnational region
level.
We hypothesise that universities increase the supply of skills, and hence reduce the price of skills;
1 Much of this literature is focused on interviewing middle managers to understand organisational structures and day to
day processes within firms. There have also been major advances in the measurement of CEO behaviour (Bandiera et al.,
2017). While CEO behaviour and management practices are correlated with each other, they also appear to be independently
correlated with firm performance.
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and that this is the mechanism through which we might expect the distance measure to be related to
firm human capital and management practices. In support of this, we show that regions with higher
university density (universities normalised by population) have a higher degree share and lower skill
premium. This is a new finding that suggests that skill is expensive when it is relatively scarce in a
location and cheap when it is abundant.
In the firm level analysis, we find a robust relationship between distance (drive time), firm level
human capital and management practices: firms further from universities have fewer skilled workers
and managers, and are on average worse managed. We control for firm and geographic characteristics,
and country, time and industry fixed effects. We include region fixed effects to control for unobservable
characteristics at the subnational level that are related to university presence and the management
of firms. In the absence of an instrument for university location using this rich international dataset,
we cannot rule out the possibility that the results are driven by better managed firms choosing
locations close to universities, though we partially address this concern by showing that there is no
differential effect for firms which are founded after their nearest university, and by considering within
firm variation as an extension to the skill premium analysis. We note however, that if our results
are driven by better managed firms making such locational decisions, they are still suggestive of a
complementarity between better management and skills.
Next, we replace distance to nearest university with the regional skill premium in our regressions
and show that firms facing higher skill premia in the region in which they are located employ
significantly less skilled workers and are significantly worse managed. We find that these results
are stronger when we exclude capital regions, where we might expect demand shocks or other
unobservables that raise both the skill premium and management practices are more prevalent.
Moreover, firms in capital cities aremore likely to be able to recruit fromwider areas (due to commuting
patterns or inward migration).
We explore whether our results are heterogeneous by observable firm characteristics, noting that
the assumption that labour markets are local may depend on firm type. We find that the relationships
between management practices and both university distance and regional skill premia are stronger
for single-plant firms compared to plants that are part of multinationals or multi-plant domestic
firms. This is intuitive, since these types of firms are likely to be less reliant on the local environment
when recruiting staff and setting management practices. Plants that are part of larger multinational
enterprises may be able to attract workers from other regions or countries due to their stronger brand,
and might also move staff between locations (Choudhury, 2017). Moreover, management practices in
such firms might be set centrally at the company headquarters, which may be in a different region or
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even country. In contrast, in the distance analysis there is no evidence of heterogeneity with respect to
observable university characteristics, including subject mix. In particular, the results are not driven by
universities offering business type courses. This suggests that the university effect is more likely to
operate via their role as producers of general human capital, rather than as providers of consultancy
services or training for local firms which we might expect to be more prevalent in business schools.
Our main regressions are estimated using surveyed firms as a cross section. A subset of firms in
the WMS were re-interviewed during the sample period which allows us to estimate how changes in
firm level human capital and skill prices affect management practices (there is not enough variation in
the number of universities over this short time frame to use the distance measure in the panel). While
this specification is demanding on the data, there remains a robust positive relationship between
firm level changes in human capital and management practices, and a negative relationship between
changes in regional skill premia and firm management practices.
The focus in this paper is on testing for complementarities by estimating demand equations
(Brynjolfsson and Milgrom, 2013). However, on a subsample of plants where performance data are
available we also examine whether there is evidence that a more highly skilled workforce increases
the marginal benefit of adopting modern management practices. This is tested using interactions
between workforce skills and management practices in performance equations (Brynjolfsson and
Milgrom, 2013). We estimate simple production functions including firm degree share, and then the
external skills measures (distance to university and regional skill premium) and their interaction with
management practices. Here we find more tentative evidence of complementarities in the case of
single plant firms only, consistent with the finding that plant-specific locational measures of skill
supply appear more relevant in such cases.
In general, a complementarity betweenworker skills andmanagement practicesmay seem intuitive.
The surveyed management practices closely resemble the complementary characteristics of “modern
manufacturing” discussed by Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Roberts (1995). Highly skilled, cross
trained workers are listed alongside (among other things) lean production techniques, performance
tracking and communications as features of the modern firm (Roberts, 1995). A more educated
workforce is more likely to show initiative and be able to effectively implement complex, flexible
and more decentralised production practices. On the other hand, one could also argue that certain
management practices and skilled workers could be substitutes. In the presence of a highly skilled
workforce, there may be less need for constant performance tracking and communicating - more
able workers could just be left to get on with their jobs. Of course, there may be heterogeneity
in these relationships for different types of management practices but our results show that skills
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and management are, on average, not substitute inputs to production. Shedding light on this issue
empirically is therefore valuable for helping managers and policy makers understand best how to
improve management practices and hence productivity.
This paper contributes to the literature that seeks to explain the differences inmanagement practices
that are observed across firms. In a series of papers, Bloom, Sadun, Van Reenen and co-authors have
shown that education of both managers and workers are strongly correlated with management scores
(Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, 2010; Bloom et al., 2014b). Using Census Bureau survey data on plants
in the US, Bloom et al. (2017a) show that plants within counties with “quasi-random” land grant
colleges (Moretti, 2004) have significantly higher management scores, and the same can be said for
counties with a higher college share in the working age population.2 Bender et al. (2018) use matched
employer-employee data in Germany to show that better managed firms recruit and retain skilled
workers.3 We contribute to this literature by using newly collated international measures of skills
which are external to the firm. Our empirical strategy of using distance to universities has been used
widely in the labour economics and innovation literatures.4 This paper is the first, to our knowledge,
that relates distance to universities to firm management.5
More generally, we contribute to the evidence on organisational complementarities and skill biased
technology. A theoretical framework for thinking about organisational complementarities is set out by
Milgrom and Roberts (1990), and Brynjolfsson and Milgrom (2013) give an overview of the theory
and empirics of organisational complementarities.6 Much of the empirical literature has focused on
testing whether different types of organisational practices are optimally implemented together (for
example Ichniowski et al., 1997; Bresnahan et al., 2002; Black and Lynch, 2001, 2004). Our work using
regional skill premia uses a similar approach to Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) who find evidence of
skill-biased organisational change. There is compelling evidence that management can be thought
of as an organisational technology (Bloom et al., 2016), creating a link to the skill-biased technical
change literature. In models of endogenous technology adoption (Basu and Weil, 1998; Zeira, 1998;
2 This is the working paper version of Bloom et al. (2019). Together with human capital, this paper explores three other
drivers of management practices - competition, business environment and learning spillovers - and finds that together they
account for about a third of the variation in management practices.
3 Using administrative data from Portugal Queiro (2016) finds that firmswith educatedmanagers have better performance,
and suggests that the mechanism for this involves educated managers being more likely to introduce new technologies.
4 See for example, Card (1995) that relates distance to university to individual level enrollment at university. Examples
of papers that relate proximity to universities to firm innovation include Anselin et al. (1997), Henderson et al. (1998) and
Belenzon and Schankerman (2013)
5 The WHED data in this paper have also been employed by Bloom et al. (2017b), who relate distance to university to
hospital management practices. In contrast with our findings, they show that hospitals closer to universities with both
business and medical schools are better managed, but that there are no effects for universities with only one of these
departments, or neither. This suggests that specialist knowledge or training of managers (medical and MBA) is more
important in the management of hospitals. Our results support a more of a general human capital effect, as university
proximity is associated with a higher share of both managers and workers with a degree and better management practices,
with no evidence of heterogeneity by broad university subject areas.
6 Ennen and Richter (2010) also give review of the management, economics and other related literatures.
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Caselli, 1999), which are tested using time series data in (Beaudry and Green, 2003, 2005), when a
major technology becomes available, it is not adopted immediately by all agents. Instead it is adopted
in environments where complementary factors are plentiful and cheap. Beaudry et al. (2010) find
that US cities with low skill premia adopted computers more intensively, and Garicano and Heaton
(2010) find evidence of complementarity between IT and skilled workers in US police departments.
Our contribution to this literature is to provide empirical evidence that management practices are
complementary with human capital based on an international sample of manufacturing firms, and
newly collated data on universities and labour markets.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 1 describes the data. Section 2 sets out our conceptual
framework and econometric strategy, and Section 3 our results. Section 4 provides some concluding
comments.
1 Data
1.1 Overview of Data Sources
We use data from three main sources, the key features of which are described in this section (for further
details see the Data Appendix). Survey data on management practices and skills in manufacturing
plants are obtained from the World Management Survey (WMS). The unit of observation is the
manufacturing plant (referred to interchangeably as the firm in this paper). WMS questions relate to
the management practices at a particular plant surveyed (rather than the head office, which might
differ in the case of multi-plant firms).7 Therefore the WMS gives a measure of management practices
at a particular location, which makes the spatial approach taken in this paper appropriate. The
measure of management practices is the standardised WMS management score, which is based on
the average score that a plant achieves across 18 practices (broadly relating to operations, monitoring,
targets and people management). It has been shown that management scores are positively and
robustly correlated with performance (e.g. Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom et al., 2014b, 2016),
a relationship that holds across countries, sectors and types of firm. We therefore interpret a higher
management score as “better” management. The share of the workforce with a university degree is
our measure of human capital - this is available for the total workforce, and managers/non-managers
separately. In the distance analysis, we use data from surveys conducted between 2004 and 2010
across 19 countries, as a pooled cross section.
Information on universities across countries is sourced from the World Higher Education Database
7 The analysis in this paper is at the plant level and we are clear when we explore heterogeneity across plants that are
single-plant firms versus those that are part of multi-plant domestic or multinational enterprises.
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(WHED), which provides data on the location and other university characteristics (such as subjects or
level of study offered, and founding date). See Valero and Van Reenen (2019) for a full description of
the data. We geocode universities and plants, by mapping their postcodes to geographic coordinates.
This enables us to calculate the main distance measure by estimating drive times between each plant
and its nearest university. We favour drive time instead of a straight line distance because it accounts
for natural geographic features. Given that the analysis in this paper is based on an international
sample with differing geographies across countries, this helps to account for distance in a consistent
manner. Alternative distance measures are explored in the robustness.
Analysis of the relationships between regional skill premia, firm human capital and management
practices is conducted on a subsample of 13 countries where we were able to access international
labour force survey (or equivalent) data sources.8 Skill premia are estimated using wage regressions,
where log wages are regressed on education, experience, experience squared and gender, by region.
Our preferred specification includes a dummy variable to indicate whether or not an individual has a
degree, and the estimated skill premium is the coefficient on this dummy. Available observations in
regions are pooled over the years where data were available, and year fixed effects included in the
regressions. We also compute the regional degree share and a raw wage ratio (the log ratio of skilled
wages to unskilled wages), measures that were available for additional countries as ready-made
regional aggregates.9 Retrieving the skill premium from regional wage regressions is preferred as this
controls for other factors that might differ across groups and regions.
The key geographic control is population density at the location of the plant (within 100km), which
is based on data from the Center for International Earth Science (CIESIN) data. Other regional data
were obtained from Gennaioli et al. (2013). In addition to average years of education, and college
share which is used to sense check the supply of skills data collected from surveys, there are also other
covariates such as as temperature, inverse distance to coast and oil per capita and population.
1.2 Descriptive Statistics
A summary of the key variables used in our analysis is provided in the Data Appendix. The mean
management score in our sample is just under 3. In the average plant, 15 per cent of the total workforce
have a degree. This is closer to 60 per cent looking only at managers, and 10 per cent for non-managers.
In our regressions we take the natural log of the degree share, and add one so that zero observations
8 For more details on the data sources and citations see the Data Appendix.
9 Microdata were obtained for 14 countries, and ready-made regional aggregates for an additional 4 countries. Our main
analysis sample is based on 13 countries where reliable wage data were available, and the wider samples are included in
robustness.
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are kept in the sample. We control for plant and firm employment, plant age and MNE status.10
Just under half of plants are part of a multinational enterprise, and 59 per cent have more than one
production site (multi-unit production). In our analysis, we consider multi-plant firms those that are
either part of a multinational, or have multi-unit domestic production. Just over half of the plants are
part of a large firm (which we define as having over 300 employees), and 28 per cent are listed. 40 per
cent of the workforce of the average plant is in a union.
The average distance (drive time) to the nearest university is 0.45 hours. Figure 1 plots the
histogram of driving times in 10 minute bins which is clearly skewed to the right. In the robustness,
we experiment with using the natural log of the drive time, and exclude observations that are in the
same postcode as universities (and hence have a drive time of zero). Locational features are controlled
for by including longitude, latitude and average population density within a 100km radius of the
plant. The average plant in our sample is in a region where the skill premium is 0.57, 20 per cent of
the workforce have a degree and there are four universities per million people.
Country-level descriptive statistics on the sample on which we conduct our analysis are also
reported in the Appendix. The United States has the highest management scores on average, though
there is also substantial within-country variation. The highest degree share is in Japan, where 32
per cent of the workforce of the average plant are university graduates. The skill premia appear of
reasonable magnitude compared to estimates from the literature.11 There is also variation in the mean
distances and skill premia across countries.
In this paper our focus is on finer grained analysis based on variation within countries or regions.
The region in this analysis is generally equivalent to a US state or NUTS1-2 regions in Europe, and our
sample contains 314 such regions across the 19 countries listed.12
2 Conceptual Framework and Empirical Strategy
2.1 Conceptual Framework
By their nature, it is reasonable to hypothesise that modern management practices and human capital
are complements. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Roberts (1995) analysed “modern manufacturing”
and argued that, given that there are complementarities among organisational practices, a range
of practices may need to be implemented together for a particular technological advance to raise
efficiency. A highly skilled workforce with transferrable skills is listed as one of the features of modern
10 Missing values are imputed and a dummy to indicate missing status is included in regressions.
11 For example, see Strauss and de la Maisonneuve (2007) for OECD country estimates.
12 In the Appendix we report the number of regions in each country and show that there is substantial within-region
variation in the key variables of interest.
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manufacturing.
The management practices scores in the WMS closely resemble Roberts’ modern manufacturing.
A well-managed firm is defined as one that has successfully implemented modern manufacturing
techniques; and one that is “continuously monitoring and trying to improve its processes, setting
comprehensive and stretching targets, and promoting high-performing employees and fixing (by
training or exit) underperforming employees” (Bloom et al., 2012).
A simple framework helps illustrate one path to our empirical strategy. We assume a neoclassical
production function in a static environment. Y “ FpA, M, Hq where output Y is some function
of technology and human capital inputs H with BY{BH ą 0 and BY2{BH2 ă 0.13 We distinguish
between production technology A and management technology M (Lucas, 1978). It is assumed that
performance is increasing continuously in the level of management quality14, so BY{BM ą 0 and
BY2{BM2 ă 0. Human capital-management complementarity, which we refer to as “skill biased
management”, implies a positive cross derivative: BY2{BMBH ą 0. It follows therefore that in
equilibrium, the firm’s managerial technology is an increasing function of human capital:
M “ GpH, A, ηq (1)
We interpret Equation 1 as a demand equation in a complementarity framework (see for example
Bresnahan et al., 2002), but other interpretations are possible.15 This framework captures the fact that
conditioning on firm level human capital, there is variation across firms in management practices due
to other technologies, information frictions, optimisation errors or other idiosyncratic factors (η).
While our core analysis is focused on “demand equations” as represented in Equation 1, we also
estimate production functions including levels of H (or a shifter of this), M and their interaction. The
levels reflect the extent to which the firm has successfully adopted modern management practices and
the degree to which the firm uses more highly skilled labour; while the interaction term will reflect
complementarity (a positive cross-derivative implies a positive coefficient on the interaction term).
13 We abstract from standard capital and labour for ease of notation.
14 See Bloom et al. (2016) for a full description of management as a technology, which is modelled as an intangible capital
stock, and evidence to support this view.
15 If we interpret equation 1 as a production function, better management is “produced” by higher skilled managers or
workers. An alternative interpretation (Nelson and Phelps, 1966) is that managers and workers of higher skill are able to
draw and adapt random management technology from a better distribution. An interpretation closer to Lucas (1978) is that
skilled managers are matched with better workers.
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2.2 Empirical Strategy
Suppose we estimated the following using OLS:
Mi “ β0 ` β1Hi ` β2Xi ` ui (2)
where for firm i, M is the management score, H is the level of human capital, X is observable
firm characteristics including size and industry, and u is an idiosyncratic error term. A number
of endogeneity issues arise. First, there are issues of omitted variables bias, the sign of which will
depend on the nature of the omitted technologies A. For example, if information technologies that
facilitate better management practices are positively correlated with skills, the bias would be positive.
But if communication technologies that facilitate better management practices lead to a reduction
in worker skills, the bias would be negative.16 Intangible assets such as brand or firm culture may
also be embodied in this unobserved technology, and such assets are also likely to be correlated with
both management practices and worker skills. Second, observed correlations between management
practices and skills might reflect reverse causality, if workers with higher human capital choose to
work in better managed firms. We therefore need to find exogenous variation in workforce skills to be
able to make a causal claim about the relationship between skills and management practices.
Our empirical strategy uses variation in the skill environments faced by firms, in a world with
frictions that prevent the skill price equalising across space.17 It can be described schematically as
follows:
Universitiesk Ñ Skill Supplyk Ñ Skill Pricek Ñ Hik Ñ Mik
where the first arrow represents the relationship between the spatial presence of universities and
supply of human capital (measured as the share of the workforce with a degree in a region k), which
we hypothesise will be positive. This rests on the assumption that student mobility is imperfect after
graduation, so that at least some graduates stay and contribute to the local labour market. This seems
reasonable based on observations in the US and the UK.18 The share of skilled labour in the region
can be expected to affect the relative skill price (skill premium), which we hypothesise will affect the
hiring decisions of firms. All else equal, we would expect that a higher skill premium would result
16 Bloom et al. (2014a) find that improvements in information technologies lead to decentralisation, while improvements
in communication technologies have the opposite effect.
17 In the absence of frictions, the price of skill would equalise (via the law of one price). In such a world, university
presence should have no effect on skill shares in a local area. In reality, frictions and the inelastic supply of non-tradables
such as land limit the extent of price equalisation - see for example, Roback (1988) and Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009).
18 For example, Kodrzycki (2001) looks at NSLY data in the US and finds that over two-thirds of college graduates remain
in the same state post graduation. Data from the UK Higher Education Statistics Authority shows that a high fraction of first
degree graduates in a region remain in the same region for work. In 2004-05, this fraction was 61 per cent.
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in a lower degree share in the firm (Hik) since skilled labour is more expensive relative to unskilled
labour. Finally, skill biased management would imply that there is a positive relationship between
firm level human capital and the adoption of complementary management practices.
Our empirical approach to estimating these relationships is largely dictated by data availabil-
ity and issues of aggregation. We begin by aggregating to the region level (equivalent to a US
state), and linking university presence in a region with regional skills and prices (Universitiesk Ñ
Skill Supplyk, Skill Pricek). We then estimate the reduced form relationship between university pres-
ence and firm skills and management practices (Universitiesik Ñ Hik, Mik), calculating a firm specific
distance measure between each firm and its closest university. In this analysis we are able to examine
within region variation, so that unobservable factors that affect regional skills and firm outcomes
are controlled for. To get more information on the mechanism and explore the effects of relative
skill prices, we estimate the associations between regional skill prices, firm skills and management
practices (Skill Pricek Ñ Hik, Mik).
2.2.1 Distance to University, Firm Skills and Management Practices
Our reduced form analysis examines the relationships between firm skills and management practices
and distance to closest university. We estimate:
Yijkct “ α1Distijkct ` X
1
ijkctα2 ` φj ` ξk ` τt ` ε ijkct (3)
for firm i in sector j, region k, country c and survey year t. The outcome variable Y P tM, Hu. The
distance variable, Dist, is measured as the drive time to the nearest university in hours. We expect α1
to be negative, firms closer to universities should have a higher degree share and be better managed,
due to their improved access to skills.
We include a number of firm controls, X, that have been shown to matter for management practices
(see for example Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom et al., 2016), and are likely to be related to skill
share in the firm too. These include firm size, age and ownership status - we also include industry
fixed effects φj. To pick up any differences over the years in which the WMS surveys are conducted,
we include year dummies τt. ε ijkct is the error term, which we cluster at the region level to allow for
heteroskedasticity and correlation between firms in the same region. In the robustness we show that
results are unchanged if we allow for more general spatial correlation.
To address concerns regarding location specific factors which may confound our estimates we
do several things. First, we include regional fixed effects (ξk). We also control for geographic
characteristics which may be correlated with both skills and the management of firms: in particular
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population density within 100km of the plant (also, longitude and latitude).
There are two main concerns around this estimation strategy. First, we may worry that well
managed firms are endogenously located close to universities. To partially address this we examine
universities founded after the firms were founded and show our results are similar. It seems less likely
that there would be issues of reverse causality (that universities choose locations close to medium
sized manufacturing firms - those surveyed in the WMS - with higher management scores), or firms
endogenously choosing locations on the basis of future university openings.
Second, we may worry about the interpretation of a relationship between distance to universities
and management practices. Such a relationship could be due to the diffusion of information or advice
from universities to surrounding firms, for example via consultancy services, managerial training or
access to more specialised inputs - rather than through an effect on the supply of skills as our diagram
suggests. In practice, both mechanisms are likely to be at play, but if non human capital routes were
more important we would expect that universities with certain subject mixes may have more of an
effect - in particular, business, economics, finance, or even engineering and sciences. We are able to
filter such universities, and show that they do not drive our results.19
2.2.2 Regional Skill Premia, Firm Skills and Management Practices
We now turn to our analysis of how firm human capital and management practices respond to the
relative price of skills they face. The purpose of this part of the analysis is to provide evidence that
firms respond to regional skill prices.
The regressions are similar to Equation 3, but the distance term is replaced by the skill premium.
In this spatial analysis, skill premia (the log ratio of skilled wages to unskilled wages) need to be
calculated based on a locational unit, and in line with the literature (see for example Caroli and
Van Reenen, 2001; Gennaioli et al., 2013) and what is feasible from a data perspective, we choose
the subnational region, equivalent to a US state. We use the average skill premium over the period
2005-2010. Our main measure is the coefficient on a degree dummy from wage regressions, which is
an estimate of the skill premium having controlled for other factors (such as worker experience). We
expect that the coefficient on the skill premium will be negative: firms facing a higher skill premium
will have lower human capital and be worse managed if skill biased management holds.
Since the skill premium varies at the regional level, we are unable to include region fixed effects
in these regressions, but we do include country dummies. These regressions are weighted using the
19 Under the caveats above and the (strong) assumption that the exclusion restriction holds, i.e. that universities affect
management only via their impact on the supply of skills, we also estimate the relationship between firm skills and
management using the distance measure as an instrument for firm skills.
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population in a region divided by the population in the country to reduce the effects of outliers in low
population regions (for which labour force data is likely to be less reliable), and standard errors are
clustered at the region level as before.
3 Results
3.1 Basic Relationships
A number of correlations motivate the analysis in this paper. The firm level correlation between degree
share and management practices has been established in the literature (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007;
Bloom et al., 2014b) and is the starting point for this study. Figure 2 plots the correlation between
average management scores of firms within 20 equally sized bins in terms of degree share (absorbing
country and survey wave fixed effects, though results are not sensitive to this), showing a positive and
precise relationship.20 This strong relationship exists for both managers and non managers as shown
in Table 1 which reports the regression equivalent.21 AWald test on the coefficients on managers and
workers in column (4) shows that these are not significantly different from each other, and we keep
our focus on total workforce skills in the analysis that will follow.
Figure 3 is a visualisation of the basic correlations between distance to nearest university, manage-
ment practices and firm degree share, absorbing country and survey wave fixed effects. This shows
that firms that are further from their closest university tend to have lower management scores and a
lower degree share.22
Finally, a key assumption in our regional skill premium analysis is that a higher price of skills in a
region reflects lower supply and we therefore expect a negative correlation between the regional skill
premium and degree share. We find that this is indeed the case (see Appendix Figure A1) and that the
negative correlation is stronger when we omit capital regions. This seems intuitive, as demand shocks
and other unobservables that raise both the skill premium and the supply of skilled workers may be
considered more likely in hubs of economic activity.23
20 These relationships are as strong using the unlogged degree share, but we use the natural log since this provides a
better fit to the data (the equivalent plot of the unlogged degree share reveals a non-linearity in the relationship).
21 Note that standard errors are clustered at the region level for consistency with later analysis. The relationship between
firm skills and management practices remains highly significant, though coefficients are smaller in magnitude when a full
set of controls are included.
22 These graphs show that there are some outlier observations in remote regions. These are spread across countries with
larger landmass, including Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, China and India. We retain these in the analysis, even
though dropping them strengthens the relationships. When we construct our distance measures, we winsorise the distances
of very remote plants to the regional maximum, see the Data Appendix for more details. Our regression results are robust to
dropping such cases.
23 To reflect this, our regional regressions that follow include a dummy variable indicating regions that contain a capital
city.
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3.2 Main Results
3.2.1 Universities, Regional Skills and Skill Premia
We begin with some region level analysis to support the first causal link hypothesised in Section 2; the
relationship between the location of universities, skill supply and skill premia. Table 2 shows that the
correlations between regional university density (number of universities per million people), degree
share and the estimated skill premium are significant and of the expected sign. Column (1) controls
only for country dummies, and column (2) adds geographic controls. This analysis suggests that a one
per cent rise in university density is associated with a 0.2 per cent higher degree share and a 0.03 per
cent lower skill premium.24
3.2.2 Distance to University, Firm Skills and Management Practices
Next we report the reduced from relationships between firm management practices, degree share and
distance to university (Table 3). The dependent variable in Panel A is the standardised management
score. Column (1) includes country and year dummies plus survey controls to reduce noise in the
data. The relationship between management scores and distance is negative and significant. Column
(2) adds region fixed effects which have little impact on the main coefficient. In column (3), industry
dummies and firm controls (as reported) are added and these reduce the magnitude of the coefficient
slightly to -0.047. Column (4) adds geographic controls (population density, longitude and latitude,
not reported here) none of which are significant, and the our coefficient is unchanged. Column
(4) is the core specification, and implies that plants that are an extra hour of drive time away from
their closest university (which is roughly two standard deviations) have on average 0.05 standard
deviations worse management practices. In the next section we show that this result is robust to
alternative specifications and sample selection.
Panel B reports regressions of firm level degree share on distance to university. Again, there is a
significant and negative correlation between distance and degree share of -0.16 (column (1)). This
decreases slightly in magnitude as we add controls in the order discussed previously. The result in
column (4) implies that an extra hour of driving time reduces the log degree share by 0.12, representing
over a tenth of the standard deviation across firms.25
The results of the core specifications (Table 3, column (4)) are depicted in Figure 4. This analysis
24 In further analysis, not reported here, consistent relationships are found with alternative measures of skills including
the simple log wage ratio and variables sourced from Gennaioli et al. (2013): their estimate of college share and average
years of education.
25 We also estimated column (4) for managers and non-managers separately and found that the effect is negative and
highly significant for both (the coefficient on distance for degree share of managers is -0.09, and the coefficient for non
managers is -0.12, both are significant at the 1 per cent level).
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suggests that, within regions, firms located close to universities have both higher human capital and
higher management scores. While we cannot rule out the possibility that better managed firms are
locating near to universities, or universities are providing other support that raises management
practices, we go some way towards addressing these concerns in the analysis that follows.
3.2.3 Regional Skill Premia, Firm Skills and Management Practices
We have seen that regions with higher university density tend to have lower skill premia. In this
section we provide evidence to suggest that the mechanism underlying the relationship between
distance to university, skills and management practices is, at least in part, via the role of universities
in increasing the supply and reducing the price of skills in their local area.
The relationships between regional skill premia and firmmanagement practices and human capital
are reported in Table 4 on the subsample of countries where labour force microdata were collected.
The dependent variable in Panel A is the standardised management score. Column (1) controls only
for country and year fixed effects, and shows that management scores are negatively and significantly
related to regional skill premia. Column (2) adds 2 digit industry dummies and firm controls (consis-
tent with the previous analysis) which reduces the coefficient. The addition of plant level geographic
controls (longitude, latitude and population density) in column (3) increases significance.26 Column
(4) adds survey controls and our coefficient is slightly reduced.27 The coefficient of -0.82 implies that a
one per cent rise in the degree premium leads to a 0.0082 standard deviation reduction in management
scores. To assess the magnitude of this effect, we apply it to the variation between US states. It implies
that a one standard deviation rise in the skill premium reduces management scores by -0.048 standard
deviations, representing 18 per cent of the cross-state variation.28 Column (5) reports the result when
capital regions are dropped, the relationship is now stronger and significant at the 1 per cent level,
suggesting that unobservables that raise management practices and also raise the skill premium are
more prevalent in capital regions.
The relationship between skill premia and degree share is less precisely estimated (Panel B), but
still negative. In fact our coefficient gets stronger and more precise as geographic controls are added,
in particular the capital region dummy. In column (4), the coefficient is -0.86, and significant at the 5
per cent level. As in Panel (A), excluding capital regions altogether increases the magnitude of the
26 We show that the core specification, column (4) is robust also to the addition of regional geographic controls in the
robustness (see Appendix Table A11).
27 Here we exclude the analyst dummies. This model using region-level variation has fewer effective degrees of freedom
and we find that the analyst dummies have a large effect, reducing the magnitude of the coefficient and raising the standard
errors (see Appendix Table A11). We therefore leave them out of this core specification.
28 The cross-state standard deviation of the degree premium in the US is 0.058. -0.82 x 0.058 = -0.048, which is 18 per cent
of the cross region standard deviation in management scores (0.27).
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effect and its significance.
3.3 Robustness and Heterogeneity
3.3.1 Summary of Robustness Tests
The results so far provide strong evidence that distance to university and regional skill premia matter
for firm management practices. We test the robustness of the relationships between management
practices and both the distance and skill premium measures, and the results are detailed in Appendix
B. First, we show that the distance results are robust to different specification assumptions with
respect to the clustering of standard errors, allowing non linearities in the distance measure, including
additional geographic controls (in particular local population density), or more detailed fixed effects.
We experiment with different distance measures that do not take geographical features into account
(driving distance, straight line distance and the number of universities within a 100km radius). With
driving and straight line distance, the coefficient takes the expected sign but precision is lost, while
there is a positive relationship between management practices and the quantity of universities. Results
are robust to different sample choices. We also add more granular fixed effects to the regressions. The
distance coefficient remains negative and significant on the inclusion of country - year dummies, and
region-industry dummies, but significance is lost in some of the more demanding specifications, for
example using county or city level fixed effects.
Analogue robustness tests are carried out on our regional skill premium regressions (using the
full sample that includes capital regions). These show that the sign of the relationship between skill
premia and management practices is robust to different assumptions on specification and sample, but
precision is lost in some cases. In particular, when standard errors are clustered at the country level, or
when the regressions are unweighted (more noise is expected as skill premia are likely to be worse
measured in less populous regions where sample sizes are smaller). In addition, we explore whether
the expected relationships exist for alternative measures of regional skills such as a raw regional
wage ratio or various quantity measures (such as degree share or regional years of education). In
general, the coefficients on these measures are of the expected sign but they tend not to be significant
at conventional levels. These measures are likely to provide a more noisy measure of the supply of
skills in the labour market: the raw wage ratio does not correct for years of experience and gender;
quantity based measures such as college share do not reflect how the market values skills; and an
additional year of education means different things in different contexts or stages of education.29
29 Indeed, the fact that our management regressions are not robust to quantity measures is consistent with Caroli and
Van Reenen (2001), where the main measure of skills supply is the skill premium.
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3.3.2 Heterogeneity Across Firm or University Type
We explore whether there is heterogeneity across observable characteristics of firms and universities to
gain a better understanding of the mechanisms driving our results. We find evidence of heterogeneity
in effects between plants that belong to multi-plant enterprises (defined as either being part of
multinational firms or firms that have more than one production site domestically) and those that are
single-plant firms. This appears to be the case in both the distance and skill premium specifications
(Table 5). Column (1) shows our distance regression with a dummy for multi-plant firms.30 In column
(2) we add an interaction term between distance and the multi-plant dummy. This is positive but not
significant, but the effect for single-plant firms is slightly larger. In columns (3) and (4) we replicate
columns (1) and (2) on the sample for which skill premia are available. The average effect across all
plants on the reduced sample is similar in this sample (0.056 compared to 0.049 in the full sample), but
the effect of distance in single-plant firms is double the size (-0.11) and significant at the 1 per cent
level, and the interaction term is larger and more significant (the p value is 0.11). Columns (5) and (6)
show that similarly the skill premium has a stronger relationship with management practices in single
plant firms, now the interaction term is positive and significant at the 5 per cent level.
The finding that these relationships appear to be stronger in single-plant firms is intuitive as we
might expect such firms to be more sensitive to their local labour markets. Plants that are part of
a domestic multi-plant or multi-national firms are likely to have access to wider national or even
international labour markets due to their ability to transfer staff internally or recruit staff from further
afield, perhaps benefitting from a stronger or better known “brand”. The relevant skills price for
such firms is therefore not necessarily the regional skill premium; or at least we might expect that
the regional skill premium is a worse-measured estimate of the effective skills price in such cases.
A separate but related point is that in larger, multi-unit firms, management practices and processes
might be set centrally at their headquarters. This could imply that managers in constituent plants are
constrained in choosing the optimal management practices for their particular setting based on the
availability of a complementary skilled workforce; i.e. that optimisation errors are more likely in these
plants.31
Second, in the university distance analysis, we investigate whether specific types of university are
driving the results. Heterogeneity across universities may tell us something about the mechanism
through which universities impact on local firms. If we find stronger effects for universities with
30 We vary our previous regressions here slightly by including a multi-plant dummy rather than only the MNE dummy
from before.
31 We explore heterogeneity across other firm characteristics including ownership, size and union representation, and in
general there is no evidence of this in the distance specifications. On the other hand, consistent with the multi-unit results in
the skill premium analysis, there are positive and significant interaction terms with a large firm dummy and listed status.
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business departments, this could imply that it is the managerial skills that are important for the
management of firms rather than general human capital. Furthermore, we might worry that the
effects we have found are due to universities providing consulting services or other support to local
firms rather than the provision of human capital, and stronger effects for universities with business
departments could suggest this type of mechanism is at work. The results show that there is no
evidence of heterogeneity for universities offering business type courses or any other subject type (law
and social sciences, medicine and science or arts and humanities), suggesting that universities affect
firm management via their effect on general human capital rather than through the teaching of any
particular discipline (see Table A5 in the Appendix).
We also examine whether the distance effect is stronger where the nearest university was founded
before the plant. If better managed firms have based location decisions on the proximity to existing
universities, then we may expect a stronger coefficient when we look at observations where the nearest
university was founded before the plant. In fact, we find that there is no differential effect in such
cases.
Finally, we check whether the relationships between management practices and skills measures
that we have found exist for all the types of management practices scored in the WMS, or whether
skills are more important for a subset of these. We run our distance and skill premium regressions with
the standardised scores for each of the four different management practice groupings as dependent
variables: Operations, Monitoring, Targeting and People Management (see Appendix Table A6). We
find that the negative relationships with both the distance and skill premia measures apply across
all practice groupings. This is consistent with the empirical fact that management practices within
firms are correlated: a firm that scores highly on one managerial question will tend to score highly
on all of them (Bloom et al., 2014b). The coefficients vary in magnitude and significance across the
two specifications and this is not driven by the different samples. In particular, distance to university
appears to have the strongest relationship with Targeting, while the skill premium appears to be
more strongly related to People Management and Monitoring. The stronger relationship between the
skill premium and People Management, in particular, is intuitive as when skills are relatively more
expensive, it is optimal for firms to do more to recruit and retain talent.
3.3.3 Distance to University as an Instrument
Based on the reduced form analysis we have presented, showing a robust relationship between
management practices and distance to nearest university, we revisit the endogenous relationship
between firm level degree share and management practices and estimate IV regressions using distance
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to nearest university as an instrument. The first stage therefore is equivalent to the specification in
Panel B, column (4) from Table 3. The results are in the Appendix. Overall this analysis does not
suggest that OLS overestimates the relationship between firm skills and management practices as we
might expect.32 However, we treat these results with caution, as they rely not only on the exogeneity
of university location, but also on the assumption that universities affect the management of firms
only via their impact on firm degree share (rather than through direct consultancy, training services or
other externalities), which is unlikely to hold in practice.
3.4 Extensions
3.4.1 Panel Estimates
The core results in this paper are based on cross sectional analysis, and while we have addressed
concerns regarding identification to the extent possible, we cannot entirely rule out that the results are
driven by other omitted variables or endogenous plant location. Therefore it is valuable to examine
whether our relationships survive when variation is within firm. A subset of firms in a subset of
countries (twelve of our sample of 19) were re-interviewed during the sample period (2005-2010).
We begin by examining whether the firm level relationship between degree share and management
practices survives when we estimate a differenced regression (Table 6). Column (1) is the same
specification as in the basic correlations reported in Table 1 column (1) where only country and year
fixed effects are controlled for, estimated on the more recent observation in the panel sample for
comparison. Column (2) includes firm, industry, geography and noise controls. Columns (3) and (4)
then replicate the first two columns but include the average annual change in management practices
and degree share between survey waves instead of the levels. These results suggest that there is
a positive bias in OLS estimates, and that plant specific unobservables are likely to be positively
correlated with both skills and management practices.
Moving now to the regional skill premium analysis in Panel B, we also find evidence that the
effects we found in the main analysis (Table 4) are not driven entirely by unobserved factors. Here
columns (1) and (2) follow the cross sectional analysis on the reduced panel sample, but use a simple
wage ratio as our time varying measure of the skill premium33, for the nine countries in the panel
32 In fact the IV results suggest that OLS estimates are biased downwards. In general, we anticipate an upward bias
due to unobservables such as effective strategy or leadership that are likely to be positively correlated with both a higher
skilled workforce and better management practices. However, a negative bias could occur if for example, communication
technologies that are complementary with management practices, and raise management scores when employed, also
reduced the requirement for skilled workers. It could also be the case that OLS results are attenuated due to measurement
error in firm human capital which is a survey response, or reflect LATE effects whereby the relationships between firm
level human capital and management practices are stronger for firms for whom distance to university is an important
determinant of skilled workforce composition.
33 We use this measure rather than the degree dummy coefficient from regional regressions on micro labour force data
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where annual wage ratio data were available.34 We find a negative relationship between changes in
management scores and the skill premium which becomes stronger once controls are added.35
3.4.2 Performance Equations
On the subsample of firms where financial data are available, we estimate simple production functions
including firm degree share, and then separately in a reduced form approach, the external skills
measures (distance to university and regional skill premium); and their interaction with management
practices. Interacting the external measures which are proxies for the price of skills faced by the plants
allows us to examine whether the marginal benefit of adopting modern management practices is
higher when skills are cheaper. The results of this analysis are in the Appendix. In summary, we
find more tentative evidence of complementarities in the case of single plant firms only, consistent
with the finding that plant-specific locational measures of skill supply appear more relevant for such
firms. These results provide additional suggestive evidence for complementarities to support our core
analysis.
4 Conclusions
We have presented robust evidence that skills and management practices are complements using
a newly analysed dataset on international universities and newly collated data on international
subnational skill prices. Our proxy for skills access at the firm level is a measure of distance to closest
university. Firms closer to universities have both higher degree share and management scores. These
results can help us to understand one of the channels through which universities affect regional
economic performance (Valero and Van Reenen, 2019). Using our estimates of regional skill premia,
we provide evidence that universities might shift the supply and relative price of skills, which we then
show are related to firm human capital and management scores. In extensions to our main analysis we
also show that our results survive when variation is within plant, and provide some more tentative
evidence of complementarities using the performance equations approach.
Complementarity between productivity enhancing management practices and general human
capital is relevant for policymakers seeking ways to improve management in lagging firms, and
used in the cross section as there were insufficient observations in some region-year cells to calculate the latter measure
robustly on an annual basis.
34 These are France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Poland, Sweden, UK and US. Japan and Poland were not included in
our core cross section analysis, as we were not able to obtain the microdata to run wage regressions. However, ready-made
regional average wages (for skilled and unskilled workers respectively) were obtained from the statistical agencies in these
countries. We note that the results in this table are very similar when Japan and Poland are excluded.
35 Consistent with the cross sectional analysis, the coefficients are more negative when capital regions are excluded. Some
additional robustness tests on these specifications are described in the appendix.
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productivity in general for two main reasons. First, complementarity implies that policies to raise
human capital do not only raise productivity via a direct impact on worker skills, but also via an
indirect effect as firms with a skilled workforce are more likely to adopt better management practices.
Second, it implies that the payoffs from implementing polices to raise general human capital and
policies specifically aimed at improving management practices (such as managerial training) are
higher when such polices are implemented together. Similarly, the evidence presented in this paper
suggests that managers seeking to implement or maximise the effectiveness of modern management
practices should ensure that they recruit sufficiently skilled workers and managers.
There are a number of directions for future work. First, the measure of firm level human capital
used in this paper (degree share) does not account for skills acquired from vocational education
or on-the-job training. It would be valuable to understand better the specific types of skill that are
relevant with respect to modern management practices, and how these can best be acquired. Second,
the analysis in this paper is based on the manufacturing sector and similar work could be carried out
to explore whether there is evidence of complementarities in the service sectors which dominate as a
share of GDP in advanced economies like the US and UK. Finally, it would be interesting to consider
how workforce skills might complement different manager types (Bandiera et al., 2017), and how these
interact with management practices as determinants of firm performance.
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Figure 1: Histogram of Distance Measure
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NOTES: N=6,360, observations split into 10 minute bins. Distance is measured as the drive time (in hours) between a plant
and its nearest university.
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Figure 2: Firm skills and management practices
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NOTES: Scatter plot of average firm management practices on average Ln(1+degree share) within 20 evenly sized bins.
Variation is within country and wave dummies are also absorbed. Reported standard errors are clustered at the region level
for consistency with regressions in tables. The dashed line represents the line of best fit.
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Figure 3: Distance to University, Management Scores and Degree Share, Basic Correlations
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NOTES: Scatter plots of average management Z-score and degree share on average driving time within 20 evenly sized bins.
Variation is within country and wave dummies are also absorbed. Reported standard errors are clustered at the region level
for consistency with regressions in tables. The dashed line represents the line of best fit.
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Figure 4: Distance to University, Management Scores and Degree Share, Main Results
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NOTES: Scatter plots of average management Z-score and degree share on average driving time within 20 evenly sized bins.
Controls and fixed effects are absorbed as per Table 3 column (4). Reported standard errors are clustered at the region level
for consistency with regressions in tables. The dashed line represents the line of best fit.
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Table 1: Firm Skills and Management Practices, Basic Regressions
Dependent variable:
Management Z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(1+degree share) 0.260***
(0.015)
Ln(1+degree share), managers 0.206*** 0.138***
(0.013) (0.011)
Ln(1+degree share), non managers 0.196*** 0.154***
(0.010) (0.010)
Observations 6360 6360 6360 6360
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. All
columns estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at the region level in paren-
theses (for consistency with later analysis). All columns include country and year
dummies.
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Table 2: Regional Skills and Universities
(1) (2)
A: Dependent variable is Ln(region degree share)
Ln(1+universities per million) 0.176*** 0.162***
(0.036) (0.026)
Panel B: Dependent variable is skill premium in region
Ln(1+universities per million) -0.027* -0.030**
(0.015) (0.013)
Observations 208 208
Country dummies yes yes
Geographic controls no yes
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. All
columns estimated by OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses. All columns
contain country dummies. The unit of observation is a region. Skill premium is the
coefficient on a degree dummy, recovered from regional wage regressions. Geo-
graphic controls include the regional average of the plant level geographic controls:
population density within 100km, longitude and latitude, and region level variables:
capital region dummy, temperature, inverse distance to the coast, Ln(oil production)
and Ln(population).
30
Table 3: Distance to University, Plant Management and Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: Dependent variable is Management Z-score
Distance -0.067*** -0.068*** -0.047** -0.048**
(0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019)
Ln(employment, plant) 0.202*** 0.201***
(0.017) (0.017)
Ln(employment, firm) 0.069*** 0.069***
(0.012) (0.012)
Ln(plant age) -0.031** -0.031**
(0.014) (0.014)
MNE 0.389*** 0.389***
(0.031) (0.031)
B: Dependent variable is Ln(1+Degree Share)
Distance -0.161*** -0.143*** -0.112*** -0.118***
(0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027)
Ln(employment, plant) 0.062*** 0.061***
(0.019) (0.019)
Ln(employment, firm) 0.018 0.018
(0.017) (0.017)
Ln(plant age) -0.011 -0.011
(0.018) (0.018)
MNE 0.234*** 0.235***
(0.031) (0.031)
Observations 6360 6360 6360 6360
Number of clusters 314 314 314 314
Region dummies no yes yes yes
Industry dummies no no yes yes
Geography controls no no no yes
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level.
All columns estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at the region
level in parentheses. Distance is the driving time in hours from the plant to
the nearest university. All columns include country dummies, year dum-
mies, and survey controls for interviewer gender, interviewee job tenure,
interviewee seniority, interview reliability, interview day of week, time and
duration, and dummy variables for the analyst conducting the interview.
Missing values are mean-coded, and dummies included to indicate where
this is the case. Geography controls include population density, longitude
and latitude. See the Data Appendix for a description of the key variables.
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Table 4: Regional Skill Premia, Plant Management and Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A: Dependent variable is Management Z-score
Skill Premium -1.104** -0.727** -0.863** -0.824** -0.940***
(0.463) (0.349) (0.347) (0.334) (0.255)
Ln(employment, plant) 0.274*** 0.275*** 0.241*** 0.255***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.033)
Ln(employment, firm) 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.053*** 0.048**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.020)
Ln(plant age) -0.024 -0.025 -0.032 -0.030
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
MNE 0.529*** 0.525*** 0.477*** 0.402***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.052)
Capital 0.055 0.055
(0.053) (0.047)
B: Dependent variable is Ln(1+Degree Share)
Skill Premium -0.692 -0.593 -0.822** -0.855** -0.945***
(0.491) (0.403) (0.364) (0.353) (0.279)
Ln(employment, plant) 0.078** 0.081** 0.077** 0.064***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.023)
Ln(employment, firm) 0.010 0.011 0.006 0.011
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020)
Ln(plant age) 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.020
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.021)
MNE 0.355*** 0.350*** 0.340*** 0.317***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.041) (0.047)
Capital 0.135** 0.142***
(0.053) (0.050)
Observations 4553 4553 4553 4553 3879
Number of clusters 208 208 208 208 198
Industry dummies no yes yes yes yes
Geographic controls no no yes yes yes
Survey controls no no no yes yes
Capital regions yes yes yes yes no
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. All
columns estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at the region level in
parentheses. Skill premium is the coefficient on a degree dummy, recovered from
regional wage regressions. Regressions are weighted using population in the region
as a share of country population. All columns include country and year dummies.
Industry dummies are 2 digit SIC code, geography and survey controls as before
(but excluding the analyst dummies). See the Data Appendix for a description of
the key variables.
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Table 5: Heterogeneity by Multi-plant Status
Dependent variable:
Management Z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance -0.049** -0.056* -0.056** -0.107***
(0.019) (0.033) (0.022) (0.037)
Distance X Multi-plant 0.012 0.076
(0.042) (0.048)
Skill premium -0.802** -1.095***
(0.363) (0.386)
Skill premium X Multi-plant 0.381**
(0.157)
Multi-plant 0.267*** 0.262*** 0.319*** 0.284*** 0.411*** 0.180
(0.032) (0.037) (0.039) (0.047) (0.046) (0.124)
Observations 6360 6360 4553 4553 4553 4553
Number of clusters 314 314 208 208 208 208
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. All columns estimated
by OLS with standard errors clustered at the region level in parentheses. Distance is the driving time
in hours from the plant to the nearest university. Skill premium is the coefficient on a degree dummy,
recovered from regional wage regressions. Multi-plant is a dummy denoting multi-plant status, which
we define as a plant that either belongs to a multinational enterprise, or a domestic multi-plant firm.
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Table 6: Panel Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable zman zman d zman d zman
A: Firm human capital
Ln(1+degree share) 0.201*** 0.126***
(0.0233) (0.0261)
d Ln(1+degree share) 0.0569** 0.0730***
(0.0241) (0.0246)
Observations 1437 1437 1437 1437
Number of clusters 216 216 216 216
B: Regional wage ratio
ln(wage ratio) -0.245 -0.809**
(0.504) (0.409)
d ln(wage ratio) -0.521 -0.825**
(0.346) (0.401)
Observations 1017 1017 1017 1017
Number of clusters 162 162 162 162
year dummies yes yes yes yes
country dummies yes yes yes yes
controls no yes no yes
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10%
level. All columns estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at
the region level in parentheses. Ln(wage ratio) is based on calculation
from microdata or ready-made data as set out in the Data Appendix.
Sample includes all firms that were interviewed in more than one wave
over the period 2005-2010, in their latest observation. Differenced vari-
ables are calculated as average annual differences. All columns include
country and year dummies. Controls include industry, firm, geography
and noise controls as in core specifications. The regressions in Panel A
columns (2) and (4) include region fixed effects.
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